Department of Cybersecurity and Networks, Tagliatela College of Engineering, University of New Haven, United States of America.
World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews, 2025, 27(03), 581–595
Article DOI: 10.30574/wjarr.2025.27.3.3178
Received on 13July 2025; revised on 07 September 2025; accepted on 09 September 2025
The convergence of quantum computing capabilities and sophisticated cyberattacks poses unprecedented threats to critical infrastructure communications. Traditional cryptographic defenses and perimeter-based security models are increasingly inadequate against quantum-enabled adversaries and advanced persistent threats targeting operational technology (OT) environments. This paper presents a comprehensive framework for implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within a zero-trust architecture to secure critical infrastructure communications across control centers, substations, hospitals, and ports. Our approach integrates NIST-endorsed quantum-resistant cryptographic suites with identity-first network segmentation, authenticated SCADA protocol encryption, and continuous verification mechanisms. The proposed framework addresses the unique challenges of legacy industrial systems while providing scalable security for hybrid OT/IT environments. Through systematic analysis of current vulnerabilities and implementation strategies, this research demonstrates how a post-quantum zero-trust backbone can prevent catastrophic cyberattacks while maintaining operational continuity in critical infrastructure sectors.
Post-Quantum Cryptography; Zero-Trust Architecture; Critical Infrastructure; SCADA Security; Quantum-Resistant Cryptography; Industrial Control Systems
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Winifred Chukwuebuka Ayogu. Post-quantum zero-trust backbone: Securing critical infrastructure communications against quantum and conventional cyber threats. World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews, 2025, 27(03), 581–595. Article DOI: https://doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2025.27.3.3178.
Copyright © 2025 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article. This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Liscense 4.0